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Gareth Evans famously claimed that “in making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes 
are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward—upon the world. If some-
one asks me ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?’, I must attend, in 
answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I 
were answering the question ‘Will there be a third world war?’ (1982, 225). Jordi Fer-
nández’ Transparent Minds aims to develop this suggestion. Here I will not be able to 
do it full justice, given the space allotted and will confine myself to a presentation and 
discussion only of some of its central claims. 
 In the first chapter, Fernández presents the problem of self-knowledge and dis-
cusses some rival accounts. Any explanation of self-knowledge, claims Fernández, 
should explicate how come that we have “strong access” to our mental states. That is 
to say, it should explain how we can have knowledge of them other than through the 
observation of our outward behavior and inference to the best explanation; and it 
should explain why our psychological self-ascriptions are more likely to be correct 
than the corresponding third-personal ones. 
 This apparently innocuous formulation in fact proposes a weak reading of the idea 
that we have privileged access to our own mental states, by building into the notion 
the contention that the difference between a first- and a third-person perspective onto 
our own mental states depends merely on relying, or not, onto behavioral criteria and 
on inferences to the best explanation, when in fact also the introspectionist account of 
self-knowledge should be considered. Furthermore, it builds into the notion of strong 
access the idea that the especially secure way in which we know our own mental states 
differs from other people’s knowledge of them only as a matter of degree rather than in 
kind, for it is merely more secure than its third-personal counterpart. However, nei-
ther assumption is water-tight and many theorists would dispute both of them. 
 Fernández then identifies five further desiderata for a theory of self-knowledge. 
They are: the requirement, which many theorists in fact don’t share, that self-
knowledge be based on some form of cognitive achievement; the idea that cases of 
wrong self-ascriptions must be allowed; the requisite that the transparency of our 
mental states must be respected; the constraint that an explanation is owed as to why 
Moore-paradoxical contents are irrational; and, finally, the requirement that an ac-
count be given as to of why our self-ascriptions of propositional attitudes are “asser-
tive”, i.e. why they “put pressure” on us to occupy the corresponding first-order men-
tal states. 
 In the second chapter, Fernández presents the bypass model for belief. The central 
thesis is that one’s psychological self-ascriptions are based on whatever grounds sup-
port the corresponding first-order beliefs (p. 49). So the former are at least prima facie 
justified if one’s beliefs are as well, and usually they are, if they follow the            
“production-of-belief principle” (p. 46 and p. 55): if one apparently perceives/               
remembers/ acquires testimonial information/ has an intellectual seeming that P, one 
comes to believe P; and so one does if one believes Q, and believes that Q entails P. 
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 Fernández then addresses the objection that the bypass model is a better explana-
tion of how one creates one’s beliefs rather than of our knowledge of pre-existing 
ones. He concedes that many times that is the case, but he contends that there is also 
a non-deflationist reading of the question “Do you believe that P?” whose answer de-
pends on the application of the bypass model. I must confess that I wasn’t persuaded 
by the argument offered in defense of the bypass model, but I won’t dwell on that. 
 Fernández then explains how the bypass model satisfies the privileged-access and 
the strong-access requirement. It does so because we enjoy certain mental states (like 
experiences, memories, etc.) which naturally and usually lead us to form the corre-
sponding beliefs as well as second-order self-ascriptions, without any need to observe 
our own overt behavior and without having to reason from the basing mental state to 
the second-order self-ascription (p. 57). By contrast, other people will be in a position 
to ascribe a belief to us only by observing our overt behavior and by inferring to its 
likely cause. If, however, our self-ascriptions aren’t based on outer observation and  
inference to the best explanation, they aren’t open to the kinds of error that can beset 
third-personal ascriptions of belief. Hence, our own access to our own beliefs is      
different and also more secure than whatever access other people might have with   
respect to them. Fernández also claims that the bypass model is not causal, because 
the self-ascription is not causally brought about by the first-order belief, but, rather, it 
is grounded on the evidence on which that very belief is based. 
 However, it seems odd to hold that one’s self-ascriptions of belief should be justi-
fied by the evidence that prompts the first-order belief itself. Intuitively, the self-
ascription, if justified at all, should be justified by the corresponding first-order mental 
state. This would indeed match the intuition that while we may have unjustified first-
order beliefs, if they were formed on inappropriate, scant or no grounds, we could 
nevertheless be justified in self-ascribing them, for the simple reason that we do have 
them. To rescue this compelling intuition, Fernández has to say (p. 66) that while the 
subject would have evidence but no justification for the first-order belief, that very  
evidence would count as a justification for her self-ascription. Now, besides the      
difficulty of distinguishing between evidence and grounds in a satisfactory way, it is 
clear that this could be so only if we considered the role of that evidence in giving rise 
to the first-order belief which would then tend to correlate with one’s self-ascription 
of it. But, if that is the case, in the end what “justifies” one in self-ascribing the belief 
is precisely the first-order belief itself, not the evidence that prompts it. 
 Moreover, it is difficult to see how the bypass model would count as non-causal. 
For, after all, it depends on the fact that once we are exposed to certain kinds of evi-
dence, we tend to form the corresponding first-order beliefs and, if conceptually 
equipped, we also tend to form the relevant psychological self-ascriptions (p. 61). 
True, if Fernández’ story were right, the causal basis of one’s psychological self-
ascription wouldn’t be the first-order belief but the grounds on which the latter is 
based, but the eventual psychological self-ascription would be arrived at by means of a 
causal process nonetheless. 
 Afterwards, Fernández considers two further objections to the bypass model: the 
one from the absence of grounds and the one from the absence of belief. The former 
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has it that if one has lost the evidence on which a given first-order belief of hers is 
based, this would seem to entail, on the bypass model, that she couldn’t self-ascribe 
that belief. The latter, in contrast, points out that the bypass model has difficulties in 
accounting for our own knowledge of lack of belief. The response to the former     
objection is that as long as one seems to remember that P, no matter what evidence 
originally prompted one’s belief that P, one has evidence for the self-ascription of the 
belief that P. The answer to the latter, in contrast, is that by reflecting on P one can 
find out that there are no sufficient grounds to endorse it (or its negation) and     
therefore form the belief that one does not believe that P. 
 These replies seem to me to miss the point of the objections. For the first hinges 
on the idea that it cannot be the evidence that led one to believe that P that justifies one’s 
self-ascription. The latter, in contrast, hinges on the fact that while there are no suffi-
cient grounds to believe that P, there is sufficient ground to self-ascribe the absence of 
belief. So the grounds on which these beliefs are based cannot be one and the same. 
 Fernández claims that his account satisfies the desideratum that self-knowledge be 
a kind of cognitive achievement for it takes some work to gather and assess the       
evidence in favor of P. Yet here Fernández seems to be re-defining the requirement  
itself. For when theorists debate over the issue of whether self-knowledge depends on 
some kind of cognitive achievement, they all take themselves to be disputing over 
whether there is a viable sense in which, by having in view a first-order belief, we come to 
form the corresponding self-ascription. Now, on that understanding of the desidera-
tum, Fernández’ proposal would actually turn out to deny that self-knowledge is the 
result of some cognitive achievement. 
 As to transparency, it should be noted that there is a traditional understanding,   
according to which one’s first-order propositional attitudes are immediately known to 
one (provided one has the relevant conceptual repertoire). Their occurrence, there-
fore, is of a piece with one’s knowledge of them. By contrast, following a more recent 
use of that term, Fernández means the idea that in making the psychological self-
ascription we literally bypass the first-order mental state to look only at the world, so 
to speak. Fernández’ model obviously satisfies the requirement so understood, but it is 
not clear that it does on its more traditional understanding. Be that as it may, to build 
this condition into the data of the problem is at the very least contentious. Evans  
himself conceived of the bypass model as a solution to the problem of explaining self-
knowledge in a way which could avoid the problem of positing the introspection of  
already given first-order mental states, rather than a constraint on any adequate        
account of self-knowledge. So, it is difficult to shake the impression that the method-
ology employed by Fernández tends, at least at times, to presuppose what it should be 
proved. 
 The third chapter shows how the bypass model can account for our knowledge of 
our own desires. Chapter four addresses the topic of Moore’s paradox, in connection 
with the desideratum of the “assertiveness” of our self-ascriptions. That is to say, the 
idea that a self-ascription of a belief or a desire puts pressure on us to occupy the cor-
responding first-order mental states. Fernández claims that if the self-ascription is 
reached through bypass, it will be based on evidence (or lack thereof) which will make 
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it epistemically appropriate for us to endorse the corresponding first-order mental 
state. If that is the case, then Moore’s paradox will represent a violation of this epis-
temic norm and will therefore be a case of “epistemic negligence” (cf. p. 127). 
 However, it is not clear how epistemic negligence can be enough to account for 
the irrationality of entertaining Moore-paradoxical contents, which is what Fernández 
himself wishes to explain. For, intuitively, irrationality requires more than mere negli-
gence. Moreover, I think that a similar worry can be raised also with respect to Fer-
nandez’ discussion of self-deception in the last chapter of the book. 
 Fernández’ Transparent Minds is a bold and instructive attempt to vindicate and de-
velop Evans’ claim that in making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to 
speak, directed outward—upon the world. The resulting picture is not very convincing 
though. Perhaps this is a sign of the fact that Evans’ intuition, as intriguing as it is, is 
not the key to the solution to the puzzle of self-knowledge.                 
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A poco más de cincuenta años de su nacimiento oficial,1 la teoría de la argumentación 
constituye un campo de estudios inter- y trans-disciplinares cuyo éxito de implanta-
ción puede medirse por la proliferación de series internacionales de congresos,2 revis-
tas especializadas3 y publicaciones de alto nivel y difusión mundial.4 
 En nuestro ámbito de habla española, el interés académico por el estudio de la ar-
gumentación también se está extendiendo en estos últimos años, sobre todo en me-
dios filosóficos y lingüísticos, a medida que languidece, de manera cada vez más pa-
                                                      
1 Hace seis años se conmemoró el cincuentenario de la publicación de dos de los libros que suelen men-
cionarse como hitos que inauguraron el campo actual de la teoría de la argumentación: The Uses of Ar-
gument de Stephen Toulmin y Traité de l’argumentation, de Chaïm Perelman y Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
ambos publicados originalmente en 1958. 
2 Ya van diez ediciones del Congreso de la Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, ocho del de 
la International Society for the Study of Argumentation, cuatro de la serie Rhetoric in Society y en 
2015 se inicia con renovado impulso y un evidente recambio generacional la serie European Confe-
rence on Argumentation (http://ecargument.org/). 
3 Las más conocidas y con mayor trayectoria del campo serían Argumentation, Informal Logic y Argumentation 
and advocacy a las que hay que añadir las más recientemente fundadas: Argumentation et analyse du discours, 
Argumentation in context o nuestra Revista iberoamericana de argumentación. 
4 Destacan, sobre todo, las series sobre argumentación y análisis del discurso de las prestigiosas editoriales 
Springer y John Benjamin’s. 
